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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
of credit. But using a better approach, the court has reached a result in
line with commercial practice. Often the bank and the beneficiary are geograph-
ically distant. The bank, draftsman of its own obligation, undertook to make
payment upon demand unless it received notice to the contrary from its customer
that the beneficiary had not fulfilled its underlying obligation. It would be too
much to ask that the bank investigate to determine if the beneficiary had, in
fact, failed to perform each condition of its obligation. Distance and expense
would make such a requirement prohibitive. Furthermore, the problem in this
case might, in all likelihood, have been caused by carelessness on the part of
plaintiff or its lawyer in failing to note the difference between the condition as
expressed in the sales contract and in the letter of credit. If plaintiff had been
aware of the existence of the discrepancy, it ought to have insisted that it be
rectified. Since the bank performed exactly what it had promised to do, it
would appear that the court was correct in holding for the bank in this situation.
CHARLES E. MILCH
CONFLICT OF LAWS-NEw Yopx LAW APPLIED TO BANK ACCOUNT
OF MARRIED FORE GN Do IcL tmd s
The Duke and Duchess of Arion, nationals and domiciliaries of Spain,
sent cash and securities to New York for safekeeping and investment during
the years of Spanish political uncertainty from 1919 to the end of the Civil
War. In establishing joint custodial accounts with several New York banks,
the husband and wife signed standard bank survivorship agreement forms valid
under New York law,' but void under the community property law of Spain.
2
In one account, the agreement expressly provided that the rights of all parties
would be governed by New York law. The husband died in 1957, the wife in
1959. Neither had ever been in New York. After the husband's death, the
wife assumed control of the property (nearly 2 million dollars) in New York
and undertook to dispose of it by a will executed according to New York
law.3 Plaintiff, as the husband's ancillary administrator in New York, sued
defendant, individually and as executor of the wife's will, to establish title to
one-half the property in New York, which, plaintiff claimed, became part of
the husband's estate under the community property law of Spain.4 After trial,
the complaint was dismissed on the merits. The Appellate Division unanimously
affirmed without opinion.6 The Court of Appeals affirmed 4 to 3. Held, that
when married foreigners place property in New York for safekeeping and
1. N.Y. Banking Law § 134(3).
2. See Spanish Civil Code arts. 1334, 1394.
3. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 47.
4. See Spanish Civil Code arts. 1424, 1426.
S. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
6. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 22 AMD.2d 853, 254 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
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investment with the intention that New York law apply to govern their rights,
their physical and legal submission of the property to that jurisdiction will be
recognized even though their rights would be determined differently in the
country of matrimonial domicile where the property was acquired. Wyatt v.
Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
The traditional choice of law rule holds that rights in real property are
governed by the law of the situs, while rights in movables are controlled by
the law of the domicile of the owner.7 This rule is applied to transfers by will s
or upon intestacy; 9 but in inter vivos transfers of tangible movables the validity
of the transfer is usually determined by the law of the place where the movable
is situated at time of transfer.1 0 Inter vivos trusts of movables have, until
recently, been governed by the traditional rule.11 However, that rule is changing
in many jurisdictions.1 2 Rather than apply an inflexible norm, courts will
consider various factors in making the choice of law. These factors are: 1)
the place of administration of the trust; 2) the situs of the corpus; and 3) the
law intended to be applied as well as the domicile of the settlor.' 3
The marital property rights inter se of spouses in real property acquired
during coverture is often said to be governed by the law of the situs of the
land.' 4 However, the majority of cases concerning the purchase of immovables
located in a non-domiciliary state have held that the character of the funds
exchanged for the immovable determined the marital rights in the latter.' 5
Marital property interests in movables acquired during coverture by gift,16
devise,17 or purchase' 8 are traditionally controlled by the law of the marital
7. Story, Conflicts § 379 (6th ed. 1865).
8. A leading case is Cross v. United States Trust Co., 131 N.Y. 330, 30 N.E. 125,
15 L.R.A. 606 (1892) (Testamentary disposition of personal property which would have
violated New York's Rule against Perpetuities held valid under law of Rhode Island, the
testator's domicile).
9. For a list of authorities, see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 165 (4th ed. 1964).
10. See, e.g., Weissman v. Banque de Bruxelles, 254 N.Y. 488, 173 N.E. 835 (1930)(validity of transfer of endorsed check).
11. Sullivan v. Babcock, 63 How. Pr. 120 (N.Y. 1882) (inter vivos trust of real and
personal property governed by law of New Jersey, the place of execution of the trust
deed and the settlor's domicile).
12. E.g., Wilmington Trust Co. v. Wilmington Trust Co., 26 Del. Ch. 397, 24 A.2d
309 (1942). (The court stated that the settlor's designation of the law to be applied will be
honored if the trust has a substantial connection with the jurisdiction.)
13. For excellent discussion of the choice of law approaches taken by the courts, see
Faulkner, Polyjurisdictional Inter Vivos Trusts of Movables, 39 Conn. Bar. J. 81 (1965);
Cavers, Trusts Inter Vivos and the Conglict of Laws, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1930).
14. See Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 238 (1934).
15. E.g., Brookman v. Durkee, 46 Wash. 578, 90 Pac. 914 (1907).
16. Meyer v. McCabe, 73 Mo. 236 (1880) (law of domicile at time of acquisition
governed ownership of gift later brought into new domicile).
17. Muus v. Muus, 29 Minn. 115, 12 N.W. 343 (1882) (wife's inheritance from father
who lived in Norway was governed by law of Minnesota, the matrimonial domicile).
18. Birmingham Waterworks Co. v. Hume, 121 Ala. 168, 25 So. 806 (1899) (husband's
ability to transfer stock originally acquired by his wife was governed by law of the
marital domicile at the time of her acquisition); see Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 290(1934).
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domicile at the time of acquisition. Removal of assets into a new jurisdiction,19
even if accompanied by change of domicile,20 will not affect pre-existing inter-
ests. But movables acquired after a change of domicile by both husband and
wife,21 or by the husband alone, will usually be determined by the law of the
new domicile.
22
In New York, there is a dearth of case-law squarely defining the rights
inter se of spouses in marital property removed from the domicile. In an 1861
case,28 the Court of Appeals allowed a French wife to recover from her hus-
band's estate the value of her property taken with him to New York without
her consent. The Court reasoned that the law of France should apply because
the husband should not have the power to affect his wife's matrimonial rights
by moving to another jurisdiction 2 4 However, the strength of this case as
authority is weak since no marital property issue was actually involved.25 The
question of marital property rights in movables did arise in several transfer
tax cases. In one case,26 a husband and wife married in France but shortly
thereafter moved to New York and lived there for twenty years. The Court
of Appeals held that, in the absence of an express ante-nuptial contract, New
York's transfer tax applied to all property acquired after the change in
domicile, and that the wife was not entitled to a one-half exemption on the
ground that she owned half her deceased husband's personal property under
French community property law.27 In another case,28 a husband, while main-
taining residence with his wife in Cuba, deposited money in New York banks
during brief visits to the United States. A unanimous Appellate Division applied
19. Jones v. Weaver, 123 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1941) (community ownership in auto-
mobile purchased in California, the matrimonial domicile, did not change when car was
driven into Arizona); King v. Bruce, 145 Tex. 647, 201 S.W.2d 803 (1947) cert. denied,
332 U.S. 769 (1947) (The community property status of funds in the marital domicile was
not changed when funds were sent to N.Y. and shortly thereafter returned.to the domicile
as the wife's separate property under a New York contract); see Restatement, Conflict
of Laws §§ 291, 292 (1934).
20. Doss v. Campbell, 19 Ala. 590, 54 Am. Dec. 198 (1851) (wife's separate property
under the law of the first domicile did not become husband's property upon being brought
into the new marital domicile); see Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 291, 292
(Tent. Draft No. 5, 1959).
21. Matter of Majot, 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 402 (1910).
22. Beemer v. Roher, 137 Cal. App. 293, 30 P.2d 547 (1934) (husband's deposits in
joint tenancy account with his brother held to be community property under California
law when the money was earned by the husband while domiciled in California; wife lived
in Kansas). But see, Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N.Y. 157 (1861). For a compromise rule, see
Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 290, comment e (1934), which states that "If the spouses
have separate domiciles at the time of the acquisition of movables, the law of the domicil
of that spouse who acquires the movables determines the extent of the interest of the other
spouse therein."
23. Bonati v. Welsch, 24 N.Y. 157 (1861).
24. Id. at 163.
25. The husband owed the wife a debt under French law independent of her marital
property rights in his acquisition during coverture.
26. Matter of Majot, 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 402 (1910).
27. Id. at 32, 92 N.E. at 403.
28. Matter of Mesa y Hernandez, 172 App. Div. 467, 159 N.Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dep't
1916).
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the Cuban community property law in recognizing the wife's claim to one-half
the estate and hence exempted that portion from taxation. The court stated:
... there was no express contract between the parties, and therefore
the law of matrimonial domicile governed, not only as to all the rights
of the parties to their property in that place, but also as to all personal
property everywhere, upon the principle that movables have no situs,
or rather that they accompany the person everywhere, while as to
immovable property the law rei sitae prevails.29
This decision was later affirmed without opinion by the Court of Appeals.30
However, a lower court31 recently applied New York law in a case where the
representatives of the estates of a deceased mother and son asserted conflicting
claims to the ownership of a joint bank account located in New York. The
mother's estate had argued that the establishment of the joint account was a
testamentary disposition in violation of Dutch law, the law of their domicile.3 2
However, the court viewed the facts as raising only a question of the validity
of an ordinary contract. The court concluded that "the law which determines the
validity of a contract.., is the law which the parties intended to apply, provided
the transaction has some reasonable connection with the place where such law
operates.133
Although the Court of Appeals, in the instant case, said that the law of
the domicile would usually govern marital property rights arising out of agree-
ments made by foreign domiciliaries outside of New York,34 it went on to
hold that
New York has a right to say as a matter of public policy whether it
will apply its own rules to property in New York of foreigners who
choose to place it here for custody or investment, and to honor or not
the formal agreements or suggestions of such owners by which New
York law would apply to property they place here.3 5
The Court stated that it was "preferable" to recognize the owner's physical
and legal submission to New York law when the property is actually brought
to New York and a request is made that New York law apply in determining
rights.3 6 The Court would thus "honor their intentional resort to the protec-
tion of our laws and their recognition of the general stability of our Govern-
ment which may well be deemed inter-related things."37 The Court found this
approach suggested by the case of Hutchison v. Ross. 3 8 In Hutchison, the
Court had applied New York law to uphold the validity of an inter vivos trust
29. Id. at 477, 159 N.Y. Supp. at 67.
30. Matter of Mesa y Hernandez, 219 N.Y. 566, 114 N.E. 1069 (1916) (Mem.).
31. In re Rosenbergers' Estates, 131 N.Y.S.2d 59 (Surr. Ct. 1954).
32. Id.. at 66.
33. Id. at 66.
34. Instant case at 172, 211 N.E.2d at 638, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 235.
35. Id. at 173, 211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.
36. Id. at 173, 211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
37. Ibid.
38. 262 N.Y. 381, 187 N.E. 65, 89 AL.R. 1007 (1933).
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of movable property established by a husband for his wife which was invalid
under the law of Quebec, the jurisdiction of the domicile. There Judge Lehman,
speaking for the Court, stated the rule
that the validity of a trust of personal property must be deter-
mined by the law of this State, when the property is situated here and
the parties intended that it should be administered here in accordance
with the laws of this State.3 9
The majority, in the instant case, quoted with approval Judge Lehman's view
that "Physical presence in one jurisdiction is a fact, the maxim [mobilia
sequuntur personam] [movables follow the law of the person] is only a juristic
formula which cannot destroy the fact. '40 The dissenters, speaking through
Chief Judge Desmond, based their position on principles of international
comity, legal precedent, and the absence of any public policy reason for
departing from the traditional rule. The present time of "shrinking distances
and enlarged wars" was said to be a poor time to change rules.41 The "directly
controlling" 42 case in New York, in their opinion, was Matter of Mesa y
Hernandez43 discussed above. Also quoted was the Restatement, Conflict of
Laws, that "movables held by spouses in community continue to be held in
community when taken into a state which does not create community inter-
ests." 44 The Hutchison case, where title passed to the trustee, was said to be
limited to the area of trusts and conveyances.4" It was also different because
the rights of third parties were involved, and the intent of the parties clearly
was to apply New York law.46 The signing in Spain by the Duke and Duchess
of "routine joint-account-for-custody agreements on forms supplied by the New
York banks" was not regarded as substantial proof of the intent of the parties.
47
In the instant case, the majority accepted, without discussion, the trial
court's finding that the spouses intended to apply New York's law of survivor-
ship to their property. The lower court had based its conclusion on the fact
that the spouses opened the joint accounts under agreements repugnant to
Spanish law and that one agreement had expressly specified that New York
law govern.48 Although the documentary evidence of their intent was conflict-
ing,49 the trial court's view is probably correct. It would seem unlikely that
the Duke lacked the advice of counsel in placing these large sums in New
York survivorship accounts. The dissent, however, found no substantial evidence
39. Id. at 395, 187 N.E. at 71, 89 A.L.R. at 1018.
40. Instant case at 174, 211 N.E.2d at 639, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 236.
41. Id. at 176, 211 N.E.2d at 640, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
42. Id. at 177, 211 N.E.2d at 641, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
43. 172 App. Div. 467, 159 N.Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dep't 1916) aff'd 1nem,, 219 N.Y. 566,
114 N.E. 1069 (1916).
44. Instant case at 178, 211 N.E.2d at 642, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
45. Id. at 180, 211 N.E.2d at 643, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
46. Id. at 180, 211 N.E.2d at 643, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 241, 242.
47. Id. at 180, 211 N.E.2d at 643, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 242.
48. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 1016, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 491 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
49. Brief for Plaintiff, app, pp. 509, 561, Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d
637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233 (1965).
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of any intent, and saw in the signing of the bank forms no more than a
routine bank precaution to avoid liability upon payment to the surviving
spouse. However, as the lower court pointed out, the Duke could just as easily
have opened separate accounts.5 0 Having accepted the trial court's crucial
finding, the majority's opinion was mainly devoted to the support of a principle
upholding the intent of foreigners to apply the forum law to property placed
there for safekeeping or investment. The majority thought the ratio decidendi
was suggested by the Hutchison case. There the Court of Appeals had stated
that the intent of the settlor-husband to submit to the law of the situs jurisdiction
was determinative of the choice of law question.51 In upholding the legality of
the trust under New York law notwithstanding an invalidating domiciliary
community-property law, Hutchison seems to suggest similar treatment for bank
accounts located in New York provided the spouses manifest their intent to
have their rights governed by the forum law. In other words, the policy expressed
in Hutchison that settlors be permitted flexibility in establishing inter vivos
trusts in the forum should apply with equal force to other types of inter vivos
financial transactions. The instant case, consistent with Hutchison, thus sub-
ordinated the policies embodied in the domicile's marital property law to a
policy of allowing spouses freedom to order their own property relations. How-
ever, in cases where intent to apply the law of the forum jurisdiction is not
present, the Court indicated that the law of the domicile would govern. The
majority cited Matter of Majot52 and Matter of Mesa y Hernandez53 as support-
ing the principle that rights of married foreign domiciliaries in personal property
arising out of agreements executed outside the forum would usually be governed
by the law of the domicile. Neither case involved the mutual intention of the
spouses to have the forum law apply.
The dissent objected to the majority's use of the Hutchison case as a
justification for departing from the conventional choice of law rule for marital
property. It distinguished that case as involving a situation where the parties'
intent to apply New York law was clear, where title had passed to a trustee,
and where the rights of third parties needed protection. It could have bolstered
its argument considerably by pointing out that Spain, unlike New York, has
a policy protecting the living heirs from disinheritance.54 Since the Duke's
50. Wyatt v. Fulrath, 38 Misc. 2d 1012, 1017, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 492 (Supp. Ct. 1963).
51. Hutchison v. Ross, 262 N.Y. 381, 395, 187 N.E. 65, 71, 89 A.L.R. 1007, 1018 (1933).
52. 199 N.Y. 29, 92 N.E. 402 (1910).
53. 172 App. Div. 467, 159 N.Y. Supp. 59 (1st Dep't 1916), aff'd mem., 219 N.Y. 566,
114 N.E. 1069 (1916).
54. See Spanish Civil Code arts. 806, 807, 808. The following is a translation of the
text of these articles:
Art. 806. The legitime is that part of his property of which the testator can not
dispose because the law has reserved it for certain heirs, called, on that account,
forced heirs.
Art. 807. The following are forced heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents
and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to
their legitimate children and descendants;
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Spanish heirs were alive, the dissent could have forcefully argued that the un-
desirability of undermining Spanish family policy required the application of
domiciliary law. Instead it contented itself in finding no evidence of the spouses'
intent to apply New York law. If the dissent had assumed, arguendo, the
presence of intent, it is submitted that the Hutchison "intent rule" could still
have been distinguished. In that case, the plaintiff had argued that inter vivos
trusts should be governed by the same rules as testamentary trusts. In rejecting
this contention, the Court of Appeals analogized the trust to an inter vivos
conveyance of movables which is governed by the law of the situs of the
movables at time of transfer. The marital property conflict rules were not
considered. The decision, however, did protect the original plaintiff's wife who
had relied on the validity of the trust for ten years, as well as the interest of
the children as remaindermen. In the instant case, the majority's refusal to
apply the law of the domicile had the effect of disinheriting the living heirs
from the two-thirds indefeasible interest guaranteed to them under Spanish
law.55 Concern for the rights of third parties in Hutchison should have led the
majority to show equal concern for the interested parties in the present case.
While a rule giving effect to the parties' intent to apply forum law often
makes sense in determining the validity of a contract,"0 the finding of intent
should not always dispose of the choice of law question. In the instant case,
the majority thought that upholding the spouses' intent was proper, since they
had sought the protection of the forum. However, this conclusion appears un-
warranted. The application of Spain's community property law would have
been equally consistent with the spouses' desire to safeguard their property.
Although this decision should be criticized for failing to give adequate weight
to the domiciliary provisions for family security, the rule probably will be
limited to situations where recourse to the forum is motivated by economic or
political instability at the foreign domicile. Different considerations of domestic
comity will no doubt make the Court cautious in extending the present ap-
proach to funds sent to New York from community property jurisdictions in
the United States.
ROBERT M. KoRNni IcH
3. The widower or widow, natural children legally acknowledged, and the father
or the mother of the latter, in the manner and to the extent established by Articles
834, 835, 836, 837, 840, 841, 842, and 846.
Art. 808. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of two-
thirds of the hereditary estate of the father or of the mother.
Nevertheless, the latter may dispose of one of the two thirds forming thelegitime in order to apply it as a betterment to their legitimate children or
descendants.
They may freely dispose of the remaining third.
55. Spanish Civil Code arts. 806, 807, 808, supra note 54.
56. See Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws, §§ 176, 177, The Rule of Validation (1962). For
critical discussion of Ehrenzweig's thesis, see Currie, Ehrenzweig and the Statute of Frauds:
An Inquiry into the "Rule of Validation," 18 Okla. L. Rev. 243 (1965).
